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Financing the retirement income and health beneﬁts of an aging popula-
tion is the most signiﬁcant ﬁscal problem facing the industrial countries
of the world. Spending on these programs is already the largest part of the
public budget in most industrial countries. The taxes to ﬁnance these out-
lays have an enormous impact on the economy. They raise the overall mar-
ginal tax rate of middle-income workers to more than 50 percent, reduc-
ing the incentive to work and increasing the incentive to take income in
the form of fringe beneﬁts and other nontaxable forms. These distor-
tions cause large deadweight losses that reduce the standard of living of
the working population.
The high tax cost of ﬁnancing the current beneﬁts for the aged reﬂects
the pay-as-you-go nature of the existing programs. In pure pay-as-you-go
(PAYGO) programs, there are no investments in private stocks and bonds
in either government trust funds or in individual accounts to reduce the
cost of providing beneﬁts. In those countries that have previously adopted
investment-based programs to supplement or replace PAYGO systems, the
cost to the taxpayers is signiﬁcantly less.
The aging of the population will make the problem substantially worse
in the next several decades. Moreover, although the retirement of the baby
boom generation will accelerate this process, the increase in the relative
number of aged in the population is a permanent shift that will make the
cost of PAYGO programs permanently higher. Actuaries estimate that this
demographic change will raise the cost of ﬁnancing existing beneﬁt rules
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1by about 50 percent or, if taxes are not to be raised, will require reducing
beneﬁts by about one-third. The provision of adequate retirement income
and appropriate medical care for the aged is thus also one of the biggest
social problems that industrial countries face.1
The Problems are Greater for Europe
Although the situation varies from country to country, the problem is
generally more serious in Europe than in the United States. There are ﬁve
reasons for this. First, the current beneﬁt costs are substantially higher
relative to gross domestic product (GDP) in Europe than in the United
States. This primarily reﬂects earlier retirement and higher ratios of bene-
ﬁts to previous wages. The earlier retirement is due to a combination of
the incentives built into the Social Security pension rules (see Gruber and
Wise 1999, and chap. 2 in this volume) and the national labor market prac-
tices designed to encourage early retirement on the mistaken presumption
that it will reduce unemployment among the young population. Because
beneﬁts are now a higher fraction of GDP in Europe than in the United
States, the increase in beneﬁts associated with any degree of aging will also
be a greater proportion of GDP as well.
Second, the demographic trends in Europe will lead to a higher ratio of
aged to young than in the United States. While the ratio of those over the
age of sixty-ﬁve to the population aged ﬁfteen to sixty-four is expected to
increase from 19 percent now to 36 percent in 2050 in the United States,
the same ratio is expected to rise in Germany from 24 percent now to 49
percent in 2050.
Third, overall tax rates are already substantially higher in Europe than
in the United States. While taxes take one-third of GDP in the United
States, the share in Europe is typically one-half or more. Since the dead-
weight loss of the tax system varies with the square of the marginal tax
rate, adding each additional percentage point to the tax rate will cause a
greater incremental deadweight loss in Europe than in the United States.
Fourth, in Europe these problems are exacerbated by the interaction of
taxes and minimum net-of-tax wages. Because legal rules and national
custom put a ﬂoor on net wages, the increased taxes raise the cost to ﬁrms
of hiring low-skilled workers. Where custom forces relative wages to re-
main roughly unchanged, the increased taxes raise the cost of hiring more-
skilled workers, as well. The result of these higher real-wage costs is an
increase in unemployment and therefore in unemployment beneﬁts and
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1. The problem of ﬁnancing health care for the aged is basically similar to the problem of
providing general retirement income. We do not discuss these similarities here, but the reader
can consult Feldstein and Samwick (1997).welfare payments. Financing these unemployment beneﬁts and welfare
payments exacerbates the problem of high social insurance taxes. The con-
sequence is a vicious spiral in which higher beneﬁts for the aged lead to
higher taxes, higher labor costs, more unemployment, and more unemploy-
ment beneﬁts and welfare payments—and thus even higher taxes, more
unemployment, and so on.
Finally, although a majority of American workers now participate in
investment-based company pension plans or have private Individual Re-
tirement Accounts (IRAs), in most European countries company pensions
are generally unfunded and individual tax-advantaged retirement saving
plans like the American IRAs do not exist.
European governments are, of course, acutely aware of these problems
and are beginning to take steps to deal with them. Although European
countries diﬀer in their responses, the common feature of the response in
almosteverycountryhasbeenareductioninfuturebeneﬁts.2Insomecases,
thiswasachievedbychanginginﬂation-indexingwithintheexistingsystem;
in others, by shifting the base for calculating beneﬁts or the age of eligibil-
ity for full beneﬁts, or by more radical changes associated with going
from traditional deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) plans to notional deﬁned contribu-
tion (DC) plans.
Some countries have shifted to investment-based systems to reduce the
long-run cost of providing beneﬁts. The Netherlands has had such a sys-
tem for a very long time. As a result, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom have already substantially funded their future beneﬁts and do
not face the kind of problem that aﬀects the others. Sweden now permits
individuals to shift 2 percentage points of their payroll tax to investment-
based individual accounts. Italy permits ﬁrms and their employees to
agree to shift their currently unfunded private severance pension plans
into regular investment-based pension accounts, although there are strong
incentives that until now have limited the adoption of this possibility. The
essays in this volume describe these changes as well as the more radical
innovations that have been made in Poland, Hungary, and Romania. The
German government has announced a plan, not yet enacted at the time
of this writing, to reduce future retirement beneﬁts while allowing workers
to save in tax-advantaged accounts to make up for the lost retirement
income.
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2. This is particularly striking to an American observer because much of the emphasis in
the current discussion about Social Security reform in the United States has been on how to
avoid future beneﬁt reductions. It is true, however, that the last major reform of Social Secu-
rity in the United States in the early 1980s also involved substantial reductions in beneﬁts
achieved through increasing the retirement age, temporarily suspending indexing, and sub-
jecting beneﬁts to taxation. There are now a number of Congressional plans in the United
States that would also resolve the future ﬁnancing problem in part by a reduction in beneﬁts.Problems for an Integrated Labor Market
The enormous diﬀerences in social security systems among the Euro-
pean countries can create substantial problems for the attempt to develop
an integrated labor market for Europe. Because the individual country
systems are essentially DB systems, someone who works in a country for
a short period of time may get nothing in exchange for the taxes that he
and his employer paid during those years. Similarly, someone who works
in several countries over the course of a lifetime will receive less than some-
one with the same earnings record who worked in a single country. Because
these beneﬁts are large, the current system may substantially discourage
cross-border mobility.
An obvious resolution of this problem would be a system based on indi-
vidual investment-based accounts. I have diﬃculty reconciling the French
prime minister’s recent rejection of such accounts on the assumption that
maintaining the current unfunded DB system is crucial for national soli-
darity with the French government’s emphasis on the need for a single
market for labor in the European Union. What does national solidarity for
employees mean in a single Europe-wide labor market?
A Life-Cycle Framework
As an economist, when I think about retirement income and the ex-
penses of old age, it seems natural to think in terms of a life-cycle frame-
work in which individuals save during their working years and dissave
during their retirement. Because of the well-known problems of short-
sighted planning and the ability of lower-income individuals to beneﬁt by
“gaming” the welfare state (i.e., undersaving in the knowledge that means-
tested beneﬁts will then be provided), retirement saving cannot be left
completely to individual discretion. With these considerations in mind, it
is surprising that individual DC accounts are not more commonly used or
discussed as a way of dealing with the current and future problems of
ﬁnancing beneﬁts for the aging population.
There is, of course, some use of such investment-based DC plans. Swe-
den has explicitly adopted this as part of its overall state pension system.
The U.K. system also has such accounts as an option and it is one that is
widely chosen.3 The transition economies that were formerly under Soviet
domination have moved further in this direction than have the major coun-
tries of western Europe.
Such individual investment-based accounts have much to recommend
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3. In the United States a majority of the voluntary employer plans (i.e., the plans that are
over and above the mandatory Social Security pensions) are now deﬁned contribution plans.
Some of the proposed reforms in the United States would also use personal retirement ac-
counts.them in comparison to alternative ways of ﬁnancing income during retire-
ment years. The most important advantage is that an investment-based
plan (or a mixed plan that combines traditional PAYGO and investment-
based components) has lower long-run costs than a PAYGO system. Cal-
culations based on U.S. demographic data show that each 1 percent of
wages saved in an investment-based system with a real return of 5.5 per-
cent can replace about 3 percent of wages collected in taxes in a PAYGO
system. This is a long-run property that reﬂects additional saving in the
transition years. Although it is not a Pareto improvement that beneﬁts all
generations, the resulting change in the consumption stream has a positive
present value because the marginal product of capital exceeds the net re-
turn that private savers receive after corporate and personal taxes.4
Individual Investment-Based Retirement Accounts
The cost-reducing advantage of an investment-based system (or a mixed
system) could in principle be achieved regardless of whether the invest-
ments are in individual accounts or in a centrally managed government
trust fund. However, the individual accounts do have several additional ad-
vantages.
First, an investment-based system automatically eliminates the existing
early retirement incentives that raise the cost of the program. Although a
PAYGO system can in principle be modiﬁed to make the present value of
retirement beneﬁts independent of the age of retirement, an investment-
based system with individual accounts automatically achieves this because
the funds belong to the individual.
Second, individual accounts avoid the risks of political control that
would accompany a centralized pool of funds, a point emphasized in this
volume by Assar Lindbeck (chap. 1). Avoiding the political control that
might accompany a centralized account is not only desirable in itself but
also could increase the rate of return on the accumulated funds and thus
reduce the cost of providing any given level of retirement income.
Individual accounts that are provided competitively by private ﬁnancial
institutions are likely to lead to greater innovation in products and a higher
standard of service than would be achieved with a government monopoly.
Assets accumulated in individual accounts could be bequeathed to
spouses or other heirs if the individual died before reaching retirement age.
Postretirement annuities could be designed to permit bequests conditional
either on the age of death or on the size of the accumulated fund. All of
this creates a greater sense of ownership than would be true in a central-
ized investment fund.
Although critics worry about the risks inherent in an investment-based
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4. For a discussion of these issues, see the appendix to Feldstein (1998).system, a number of studies show that the risk that individuals would face
in a mixed system would be relatively low and could be eliminated or re-
duced by either government guarantees or by the guarantees that could be
provided by private ﬁnancial markets.5
Finally, although there is much debate about the administrative cost of
a system of individual accounts,6 the recent introduction by TIAA-CREF7
of a saving and variable annuity plan with an annual cost of only 37 basis
points is reassuring evidence. A program in which the government would
collect the funds along with the Social Security payroll tax could be man-
aged for an even lower annual cost.
Notional Deﬁned Contribution Systems
The attractive features of a system with investment-based individual ac-
counts have induced several European countries to adopt investment-
based systems as part of their state pension programs. The transition to
an investment-based system does, however, require some additional sav-
ing. The amount of this transition saving, although relatively low,8 is one
of the barriers to adopting any degree of investment-based funding. Swe-
den, Italy, and Poland have therefore adopted something of a compromise
system in the form of notional deﬁned contributions within the broader
framework of a PAYGO system. The basic idea in such a system is that
individual employees (or those employees and their employers) pay man-
datory contributions and receive credits in individual accounts for the
amounts contributed just as they would in any other DC plan. These con-
tributions are not, however, invested in ﬁnancial assets but are paid out as
part of a PAYGO system. The notional accounts nevertheless keep track
of the individual contributions and are credited with a rate of return equal
to the growth rate of wages. In this way, the beneﬁts that will eventually
be paid are consistent with a PAYGO method of ﬁnancing with a constant
rate of tax.9
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5. See Campbell and Feldstein (2001) for several studies of the risks of PAYGO and
investment-based systems. Also see Feldstein and Ranguelova (2001b) for a discussion of
risk in a pure investment-based system. Feldstein and Ranguelova (1998) discuss ways that
the government could reduce the risk to retirees of the investment-based system, while
Feldstein and Ranguelova (2001a) show how ﬁnancial market instruments (a combination
of buying a put and selling a call) might be used to guarantee retiree beneﬁt levels.
6. See Shoven (2000) for several studies of the factors aﬀecting the administrative costs of
an individual account investment-based system.
7. Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association College Retirement Equity Fund, a very
large U.S. insurer and mutual fund provider.
8. Feldstein and Samwick (1997) showed that the transition from the existing U.S. PAYGO
system to a fully investment-based system could be done without ever increasing the payroll
tax rate by more than 2 percentage points.
9. See the papers by Palmer on Sweden and Franco on Italy (chaps. 6 and 7 in this volume,
respectively) for more details of how such systems will operate.These notional DC accounts have three major advantages over tradi-
tional DB plans. First, by linking future beneﬁts clearly and tangibly to
the individual’s contributions, they reduce the extent to which those contri-
butions are perceived as a tax. Second, the focus on the “assets” in the
individual account (even if they are only “accounting assets”) reduces the
distortion in retirement decisions. Third, notional DC accounts implicitly
limit future beneﬁts to the amounts that can be ﬁnanced by the existing
tax rates. And fourth, they provide an individual account framework
within which an investment-based system could later be introduced or ex-
panded.
It must be emphasized, however, that the notional deﬁned contributions
provide a lower rate of return than true investment-based accounts and
therefore cannot achieve the full advantages of an investment-based sys-
tem. The rate of return in a notional system can be only the rate of growth
of the tax base that results from rising real wages and increasing numbers
of employees (Samuelson 1958). This is now likely to be about 2 percent,
substantially less than the real pretax rate of return on incremental capital,
which may be as much as 9 or 10 percent. Even if individuals could receive
a net-of-tax real return of only 6 percent, the diﬀerence between that and
a 2 percent rate of return in notional accounts implies that the mandatory
contributions to the notional system are eﬀectively a tax of about three-
fourths of the statutory tax rate.10 This means that the distortions in labor
supply during working years and at the time of retirement are reduced
somewhat but are not changed substantially. The cost of funding future
retirements is not reduced as it would be with an investment-based system.
For an American looking at social security pension reform in Europe, it
is encouraging that many countries have made or are making fundamental
reforms. Yet for several of the larger countries, including France, Germany,
and Spain, the reforms are either very small or nonexistent. There is now,
however, an opportunity for these countries to learn from the experiences
of their European neighbors. Investment-based reforms can have substan-
tial favorable eﬀects but only over a long period of time. Because the dem-
ographic changes will exacerbate an already worrisome situation, Euro-
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10. To see why the eﬀective tax rate in the notional system is approximately three-fourths
of the statutory rate, consider the following example. An individual earns an additional 500
kronor (SKr) and pays mandatory contribution of 100 SKr to a notional account, equivalent
to a 20 percent tax rate. The value in the account grows at 2 percent per year. If we take age
forty as the midpoint of the years of contribution and age seventy-ﬁve as the midpoint of the
years during which beneﬁts are withdrawn, the initial 100 SKr would grow to 200 SKr. If
instead the 200 SKr of beneﬁts had been ﬁnanced by an investment-based plan that provided
a real return of 6 percent, the 200 SKr could have been accumulated with an initial deposit
of 25 SKr, equivalent to 5 percent of the 500 SKr of initial earnings. The 5 percent in the
investment-based plan is not really a tax because the individual receives a full market rate
of return. However, the excess tax (i.e., the diﬀerence between the 5 percent and the 20
percent in the notional system) is a tax. Thus three-fourths of the mandatory contribution
to the notional system should be viewed as a tax.pean governments must make major changes soon to keep their retirement
systems viable and their overall tax burdens tolerable in the decades
ahead.
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